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Main page > Products > Politics in Russia: power, lobby, conflicts - The weekly bulletin > Politics in Russia: power, lobby, conflicts. Issue No (45) 786 Politics in Russia: power, lobby, conflicts. Issue No (45) 786November 02 - 08, 2009 Main tendencies of political weekCelebrations of People’s Unity Day on November 4 were in the spotlight last week. State authorities indicated they were able to control the semantic content of this day. In 2006 to 2008 nationalists actively employed this holiday to their advantage but in 2009 they were forced to the margins of the informational field. To a great extent this occurred because of the Nashi movement that long before the day declared about its intention to mobilize 20,000 supporters, which attracted the attention of all mass media sources. This simultaneously refuted rumors about state authorities planning to abandon Nashi as they did not need this movement any longer. Besides, it is indicative that the pro-Kremlin youth movement intensified its activities on the eve of the 5th anniversary of the “orange revolution” in Ukraine. Finally, Dmitry Medvedev highlighted November 4 as day of the Russian civil society that managed to mobilize itself and defend the country’s sovereignty in the turbulent time. With November 12 set as the day of promulgation of the president’s state of the nation address attempts to oppose the president to the premier intensified in addition to imposing the anti-Putin agenda on Dmitry Medvedev. Medvedev’s sharp criticism of Stalinism and the format of the presidential reception in the Kremlin on the occasion of Day of People’s Unity were interpreted as the head of state’s desire to distance himself from Vladimir Putin at least stylistically. Meanwhile, the ex-president several years ago quite toughly spoke about his attitude towards totalitarianism and the semantic and HR “content” of receptions devoted to November 4 (e.g. in 2007) did not much differ from the latest one. Attempts of some experts to substantiate the necessity of creating the “modernization vertical” continued; it should allegedly function simultaneously with the executive power vertical. Judging by indirect signs, the tandem representatives got concerned with some decline in their rating and took measures to restore it. This was especially noticeable considering Vladimir Putin’s increased activities. In a short period of time he put forward two resonant social initiatives – to raise pensions by 50% in 2010 and to allocate over 50bn rubles in budget funds to AvtoVAZ. The premier also promised financial assistance to the domestic film industry. According to the latest polls, ratings of both politicians somewhat went up. Meanwhile, the president has a chance to strengthen his positions in the public consciousness after voicing his Address as it will be extensively covered by the mass media. Major events November 02 - 08, 2009
Volume: 14 pages If you are interested to obtain please contact » Elena Kim Other issues: |
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