|
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Main page > Products > Politics in Russia: power, lobby, conflicts - The weekly bulletin > Politics in Russia: power, lobby, conflicts. Issue No (21) 709 Politics in Russia: power, lobby, conflicts. Issue No (21) 709May 12-18, 2008 Main political trends of the weekTendencies that had been evident only due to indirect signs proved to be true last week. The reshuffle in the government and presidential administration showed that Vladimir Putin retained his critical influence on Russia’s domestic policies. At the same time hopes of some groups counting on the weakening of positions of ‘radical siloviki’ (security related bloc members) did not come true; their leader Igor Sechin not only formally confirmed his previous powers but also obtained a new direction for their expansion – the manufacturing industry. Only two members of Dmitry Medvedev’s personal staff pool received key positions; they are justice minister Alexander Konovalov and Konstantin Chuichenko (the presidential control directorate). Structural changes in the executive branch of power can be characterized on the whole as ‘varied continuity’. The government layout did not change radically, however some earlier tendencies went on. In particular, principles of the 2004 administrative reforms that Vladimir Putin acknowledged to be unsuccessful were rejected again. The executive vertical was partially reestablished: a number of agencies and services were abolished and their functions were transferred to ministries. State committees were transformed into agencies that are currently more strictly subordinate to ministries. However, Dmitry Medvedev and his supporters do not want to recognize the current power layout and are preparing ground for probable future expansion. In particular, the successor proceeded with the policy of gaining support of target groups unsatisfied with the current situation in the country. So far the main direction has been medium-sized and small businesses that are expecting implementation of some pre-election promises from the head of state. Dmitry Medvedev’s supporters in the judicial branch of power are speeding up attempts to raise its status and independence, while a number of Public Chamber members are trying to establish alternative contacts to existing ways of communication with representatives of security related bodies. The current situation and Vladimir Putin’s efforts aimed at intertwining interests of elite groups promote changes in the configuration of unions of different groups of influence. In particular, the so-called ‘bloc of the discontented’ has practically broken up, whose representatives counted on Dmitry Medvedev to get their revenge for previous defeats or to strengthen their positions. As a result, most influential bloc members have preferred either to ally with Putin’s team members or to emphasize their loyalty to the prime minister. Major events May 12 - May 18, 2008
Volume: 17 pages If you are interested to obtain please contact » Elena Kim Other issues: |
Special report:Nord Stream 2 and Ukraine: Costs Should DecideShale Revolution: Myths and RealitiesLiquefied Natural Gas Outlook: Expectations and RealityAnalytical series “The Political compass”:Political power in Russia after presidential electionState Corporations in the Russian EconomyPolitical Results of 2007: Russia on the Eve of Power ShufflePolitical Landscape Ahead of the Parliamentary Election 2007«Centers of influence» in the Russian politicsLeading Russian corporations and the executive power: interaction methodsForecast of political developments after the presidential election in 2008 |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
About us | Products | Comments | Services | Books | Conferences | Our clients | Price list | Site map | Contacts Consulting services, political risks assessment on the Fuel & Energy Industry, concern of pilitical and economic Elite within the Oil-and-Gas sector.National Energy Security Fund © 2007 |