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Main page > Products > Politics in Russia: power, lobby, conflicts - The weekly bulletin > Politics in Russia: power, lobby, conflicts. Issue No (65) 753 Politics in Russia: power, lobby, conflicts. Issue No (65) 753March 16 - March 22, 2009 Main tendencies of political weekThe trend of stabilization of the inside-elite struggle and of the tandem’s desire to maintain the status quo was confirmed last week. This inter alia was attributed to improvement of the social and economic situation. In particular, Dmitry Medvedev interfered in a dispute between the Family group’s Oleg Deripaska and Alfa Group that had been obstinate in settling the issue of the oligarch’s debts to the bank. After a meeting of the president and Mikhail Fridman, the problem turned out to be partially settled, although the ‘moratorium’ is likely to concern only RUSAL and possibly GAZ but it does not cover Oleg Deripaska’s entire business. Thus, the Family group, whose leader Alexander Voloshin lobbied the president’s support, may lose part of the assets but not all of them, which so far removes from the agenda the issue that the group’s material basis is lost. Dmitry Medvedev has acted as Vladimir Putin’s full-grown successor maintaining balance between elite groups and preventing their mutual destruction. Noticeable staff rotation was observed at some government agencies, which was attributed to correction of inside-elite positions of different officials. There were some big staff changes at the Investigation Committee last week. In particular, internal security department head Vladimir Maximenko lost his post. Some interested observers are trying to interpret this as the IC’s agony, although this is likely to mean the opposite tendency. At the initial stage of the IC’s functioning Alexander Bastrykin needed FSB support and Nikolay Patrushev’s assistance in particular to ensure that the investigation reforms were not played back. Now when it is clear that the tandem will not make any sharp organizational moves during the crisis, Bastrykin has decided to get rid of the allies occupying key posts in the entity and to strengthen his power. This was also promoted by the transfer of Nikolay Patrushev to another post; Bastrykin seems to have no agreements with FSB new chief Alexander Bortnikov. Fine-tuning of the government also continued. Vladimir Putin introduced some changes in the regulations of the executive power aimed at accelerating the process of drafting documents. Besides, there was noticeable activity on the second and third levels of government resulting in staff reshuffle. The elite is likely to have realized that the revolutionary scenario of developments (dissolution of the Cabinet, etc.) was unrealistic, and trench warfare for redistribution of administrative resources intensified again. Major events March 16, 2009 - March 22, 2009
Volume: 13 pages If you are interested to obtain please contact » Elena Kim Other issues: |
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