Politics in Russia: power, lobby, conflicts. Issue No (52) 793

December 21 - 27, 2009

Main tendencies of political week

Last week was the last full week before the holidays and political players were fixing their positions before the new season. During 2009 there have been three main tendencies in domestic policies. Firstly, a gradual drift of state authorities from the anti-crisis policy to conservative modernization. Secondly, the struggle of groups of influence for a strategy of this modernization that finished with defeat of radical liberals who now have to resort to defense tactic and get ready for a long game. Thirdly, the mechanism of the tandem functioning and role distribution in it has been finally adjusted.

In Dmitry Medvedev’s interview with central TV channels two groups of questions were highlighted. Although its format was marked as summing up the year results, this block of issues was raised at the very beginning and did not take a lot of time. The second block devoted to outlooks of the country’s development was absolutely dominant in the interview. Thus, the head of state confirmed the agenda for the short-term perspective rather than summed up the year results. It should be noted that the president clearly delimited the systemic and non-systemic opposition (as well as political activities in general). As far as the systemic opposition is concerned, the head of state confirmed his readiness to dialogue with it and discuss outlooks of the country’s development; as to the other one, he admitted its right to “live as they want” if this does not contradict the law. Another block of signals of state authorities sent last week concerned the YUKOS case. On one side, the arrest of Platon Lebedev in 2003 was found illegal (this induced cautious optimism in liberal circles); on the other side, “as compensation” the former YUKOS treasurer was put on the wanted list.

During the autumn session the State Duma gained back the status of one of the main discussion grounds for the first time in many years. It was engaged in almost all resonant campaigns in autumn and winter (the Sayano-Shushenskaya hydropower plant accident, the October 11 elections, the Nevsky Express derailment, the Perm nightclub fire). This was likely to be promoted by state authorities pursuing two objectives. Firstly, to increase the political competition level through discussion development; secondly, to control this discussion because the State Duma is under UR’s full control.

Amid fading of the Pravoe Delo project state authorities, judging by indirect signs, started showing interest in reviving Yabloko that has been in a poor state over the past few years. Firstly, Yavlinsky’s party was allowed to hold a congress. Secondly, the most high-ranking Yabloko member, federal anti-monopoly service head Igor Artemyev, was in the congress presidium. Finally, former Moscow City Duma deputy, Yabloko member Yevgeny Bunimovich was appointed Moscow children’s ombudsman. The combination of these factors provides for the supposition that state authorities are signaling Yabloko that it may return to the federal political arena.

Major events December 21 - 27, 2009

Volume: 15 pages