The death of political analysis in the absence of public politics. Political analysis in Russia isn't easy

Negative Selection

What is there for political science to study, when politics as such - public, open, comprehensible for ordinary citizens - is absent? Political analysts are just as much in the dark as anyone else, so they come up with the most bizarre forecasts.

Journalists are approaching experts for opinions less and less frequently; quoting a political analyst at the end of an article has become more of a ritual than an explanatory summary. The predictions made by these specialists tend not to come true.

Yet at this point in time, in the lead-up to two important election campaigns, both the authorities and the public need informed analysis of the situation more than ever - in order to make the right choice.

For some time, carefully-measured doses of information given out as rewards to a select few political analysts enveloped them in an aura of privileged access to secret knowledge of the Kremlin's inner workings. The consequences of this could be quite absurd at times. A few years ago, for example, Stanislav Belkovsky talked quite seriously about the Kremlin rewriting the Constitution: alleging that a draft was already in existence, and a particular official had been appointed to supervise the task.

Belkovsky hinted that he himself was a member of the rewriting team. And then the hints stopped. Here's another incident of that nature: in 2005, when politicians focused their attention on the arrest of Yevgeny Adamov in Switzerland, political analysts all declared that the former nuclear energy minister's fate would depend on a tough discussion between Vladimir Putin and Condoleezza Rice when they met in October. But Putin didn't intercede for Adamov - and he was right to refrain from doing so. And those who had predicted a "tough discussion" ended up pretending, yet again, that they never said anything of the kind.

Predictions that Putin's approval rating would soon start to decline were popular among political analysts in 2001. Putin was accused of being indecisive; in particular, he was criticized for being reluctant to intercede resolutely for Pavel Borodin, who had been arrested by the American special services. However, a poll done by the All-Russian Public Opinion Research Center (VTsIOM) indicated that citizens didn't care about these problems: Putin's approval rating rose to a record high of 76%. Last month's figure was 68%.

The errors of the experts were most strikingly displayed in their attempts to predict the new composition of the Duma before the election of December 2003. Igor Bunin, head of the Political Techniques Center, predicted in May 2003 that United Russia would get only 25% of the vote. He also suggested that the Kremlin would form a center-left group in the future Duma - including Gennadi Semigin, Gennadi Seleznev, Svetlana Goryacheva, and their supporters - with the aim of creating an alternative to the Communist Party (CPRF). In Bunin's view, the Union of Right Forces (SPS) and Yabloko were supposed to get just as many votes as they had in 1999, so they would still be represented in the lower house. Around the same time, Sergei Markov predicted that the new Duma would be more professional and goal-directed; he didn't rule out the possibility that the president might give the parliament slightly more power.

Also at that time, Andrei Ryabov from the Carnegie Moscow Center predicted that if tension escalated, as it inevitably would in the course of unpopular reforms, the Duma would be unable to stand aside from these processes, and would start drifting away from the Kremlin, toward the oligarchs.

Needless to say, none of these forecasts from big-name analysts came true. A good comment on this was made by prominent dissident Vladimir Bukovsky: "Political analysts, even the major ones, tend to include their hopes in their analyses - which is entirely wrong. Analysis should be merciless. It's like mathematics, based on precise data: you do the calculations, make estimates, consider possible options. But if you mix your own hopes into this process, they dilute your analysis and it becomes less valuable."

The mistakes made by political analysts should not be underestimated. For several years now, they have been alarming the Kremlin with predictions of an Orange Revolution in Russia, demonizing the obedient CPRF and the relatively small Dissenter March protests. As a result, the events organized by Garry Kasparov and Eduard Limonov are being regarded as "the evil empire" rather than run-of-the-mill youth protests, with the authorities declaring war on them - seeing them as a widespread and dangerous social phenomenon. The absurdity of this situation is exacerbated by rising tension in relations with Western democracies - for such a trivial reason.

Reality is also refuting the latest forecasts made by political analysts who have rushed to predict the start of a new Cold War. No, Russia did not break off relations with the West at the G8 summit in Heiligendamm. Instead, there was a "strategic dialogue" on the question of installing missile defense elements in some European countries. This dialogue is now in full swing. Yet only recently, Political Conjuncture Center Director Konstantin Simonov predicted: "Unless the representatives of Washington abandon their hostile anti-Russian course at the Heiligendamm summit, history textbooks may record June 7, 2007 as the starting date of a new Cold War."

Who are the people described as political analysts these days? That's the question asked by researcher Alexander Pavlov. His answer: "As a rule, these are the 'dark geniuses' of the political arena - people who could teach Machiavelli himself a thing or two about political literacy. These experts will present an analysis of the current political situation, then make a very precise prediction about how it will develop. If the forecast doesn't come true - and it doesn't, of course - they can easily interpret this in one way or another, and provide a convincing explanation of exactly why it didn't come true."

VTsIOM Director Valery Fedorov attributes the backwardness of Russian political science to the dominance of well-established fictions in public opinion: "We assume that everything in Russia is determined by the Kremlin, and nothing else matters. Some people who believe in this idea turn a blind eye to what is going on around them." Another reason, according to Fedorov, is that Russian political specialists look down on sociology or opinion polling. Fedorov points out that in the West, political science and sociology are regarded as the same discipline. "They have more respect for public opinion over there, and no serious analytical materials fail to include some data of this kind," says Fedorov. "But here in Russia, political analysts and sociologists or pollsters are separate, and many political analysts regard sociology or polling as 'the whore of imperialism.'"

And there's another problem as well, according to Fedorov: Russia's political analysts aren't political scientists in the strict sense of the term. A substantial number of them are political consultants "who pursue their own strategy goals when they make their statements, so their forecasts are politicized rather than scientific."

Actually, this kind of transformation is natural enough for political analysts. Who needs honest analysis? Parties are unlikely to want it; their leaders are dependent on the Kremlin's decisions, rather than the will of voters, to a significant degree. It's not surprising to see more interest in opinion polls at the regional level than in Moscow.

What kind of discoveries have been made by Russia's leading political analysts in recent years? The lackluster result of all their busy activity is a discussion of the advantages of the "sovereign democracy" concept. The person who came up with that concept might prefer to hear some constructive criticism. But hasn't he also been responsible for creating this political vacuum, which inevitably accompanies the over-centralization of power? What is there for political science to study, when politics as such - public, open, comprehensible for ordinary citizens - is absent? Political analysts are just as much in the dark as anyone else, so they come up with the most bizarre forecasts, which are forgotten within a month as new "commentaries" appear.

The authorities don't require the services of political analysts; this leads to the analysts being uninformed, which only reduced the demand for their services still further. This vicious circle can only be broken by collective efforts. As yet, neither side shows any inclination to make such an effort.

The collective consciousness of Russian political science remains baffled by the mysteries of the Kremlin.

Author: Alexandra Samarina

Source: "Nezavisimaya Gazeta- Politika", June 19, 2007

Translated by Elena Leonova