Gas exports are of significant importance for Russia. They are a source of money and foreign policy influence. Given declining gas production in the EU, growth in the gas demand in China and other Asia-Pacific countries, the issue of gas supplies is becoming more and more acute and politicized.
To some extent this is promoted by ambitions of Vladimir Putin, who is planning to turn Gazprom into a key player in the sphere of global energy security, the EU’s expansion at the cost of East European and Baltic states that have been practically fully dependant on Russian gas since the time of the Warsaw Pact and Soviet Union, as well as regular transit problems with Ukraine and Belarus.
Moscow expects a predictable and guaranteed demand, access to end users and advanced technologies of gas production and transportation from its European partners.
Brussels is trying to promote the idea of diversification of supplies and decreasing risks of monopolization of the gas market by its eastern neighbour. Russia proposes diversification of gas transportation routes bypassing transit countries and threatens to diversify its exports by organizing gas supplies to China and South Korea through pipelines and developing liquefied natural gas production. LNG will enable Russia to substantially broaden the geography of exports.
A new report by the NESF analyzes the current situation in the sphere of Russian gas exports researching important aspects of new directions of supplies as well as problems of relations with partners, buyers and transit states.
In the Report you will find detailed answers to the following questions:
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Main directions of Russian gas exports: the current situation
- Supplies to Europe
- Transit via Ukraine and Belarus
- Blue Stream and its role in Gazprom’s export strategy
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The system of gas supplies and pricing on the market
- Long-term contracts and development of supplies to end consumers
- The spot market and its prospects
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Gas battles against Europe
- Restrictions of access of non-residents to Russian reserves
- The third energy package as the European Commission’s response
- War of concepts: agreement to the Energy Charter against conceptual approaches to a new legal base of international energy cooperation
- Transit disputes
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New projects and promising directions of Russian gas exports. LNG business development
- Nord Stream instead of expanding Ukraine’s gas transportation system, construction of Yamal-Europe 2 and the Amber Baltic transit system
- South Stream and competition against the southern gas corridor
- Revival of the Blue Stream expansion project
- Eastern export channel and new target markets
- The role of LNG production development
- Feasibility of Gazprom’s strategy of LNG business development and its potential problems
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Forecast of the medium-term developments
The contents of the report:
Introduction | 2 |
Chapter 1. Russian gas exports: main directions and current situation | 3 |
1.1. Supplies of Russian gas to Europe and Turkey | 6 |
1.2. Markets of the CIS and Baltic states | 8 |
1.3. Gas supplies to Ukraine and Belarus. Constant risk of transit war | 11 |
Chapter 2. Political games around gas exports | 18 |
2.1. Gas as instrument of influence on international arena | 18 |
2.2. Relations with the West. Restrictions for non-residents to access Russian reserves and the single export channel | 20 |
2.3. Brussels stakes on diversification of sources, EC Third Energy Package and 20 20 20 Strategy | 22 |
2.4. Russia’s tactics of pressurizing EU, Big Gas Troika and Gas Exporting Countries Forum | 29 |
2.5. «Energy cold war» between Russia and EU after January crisis | 33 |
Chapter 3. New projects and promising directions of Russian gas exports | 37 |
3.1. Nord Stream instead of expanding Ukraine’s GTS, building Yamal-Europe-2 and transiting via Baltic states (Amber project) | 38 |
3.2. Revival of Blue Stream expansion project | 41 |
3.3. South Stream and competition against Southern Gas Corridor | 42 |
3.4. Role of LNG production development | 45 |
3.5. Gas supplies from Eastern Siberia and Far East through pipelines. Negotiations with China, South Korea and Japan | 50 |
3.6. Gazprom’s activities on untraditional markets of oil and gas resources (Africa, Latin America, Southeast Asia) | 54 |
Chapter 4. Conclusions and forecasts | 57 |
4.1. Gas exports during the crisis | 57 |
4.2. Prospects of the EU gas market development | 59 |
4.3. Forecast of development of Russia’s LNG projects and new pipeline routes | 60 |
Date of issue | July 13, 2009 |