Russia 2010. Part 3. Foreign Policy of Russia in 2010

(the part of book "Russia 2010. Report of Transformation")

Part 3. FOREIGN POLICY OF RUSSIA IN 2010

The key trend of the foreign policy of the RF in 2010 was concentration of the attention of Dmitry Medvedev’s administration in interaction with the countries of the Euro-Atlantic and Asian-Pacific regions (APR). That is not to say that Kremlin ceased to take interest in other directions. Its activity on the post-Soviet territory, in the Middle East and Latin America was still high. Nevertheless, the indisputable double center attracting the RF activity was the West and the APR. To develop its political and economic as well as political and military relations with these regions Moscow used all the available resources. The operation of the political and diplomatic mechanism fell into line with consistent build-up of the interaction with their constituent subjects. Such an approach was reflected in the number of direct political-diplomatic contacts. Throughout the year western and Asian counterparts had decisive superiority over others. 

The choice in favour of build-up of relations with Euro-Atlantic countries proceeded from subjective motivations of the Russian administration. Medvedev’s team is apt to consider the USA and Western Europe the major and most convenient partners for the RF. In its understanding stable interaction with Euro-Atlantic countries can ensure renovation of the technological potential of Russia n economy. In the 2010 realities such an approach was intensified by Kremlin’s striving to make the RF an organic part of Europe. This was supposed to reduce the EU resistance to Russia’s foreign policy and foreign economic initiatives.

Moscow was approaching the dialogue with western countries relying on the principles of the liberal foreign-political doctrine. The liberalism in the Russian realities means development of close relations with Euro-Atlantic countries and involvement of the RF in the global free trade zone. Apart from this the platform implies abandonment of the tough formula of conduct and positioning on the global arena and acceptance of the rules of the game proposed by the West. The tough line is replaced with a more flexible model based on instruments of Soft Power. One of the goals of the liberal program is creation of a positive image of the RF in international policy as a democratic state avoiding confrontation with other world democratic powers.

The intrigue of placing stake on liberalism involves the fact that in its actions Medvedev’s team has consistently approached the practice of the first Russian president Boris Yeltsin. Many things in the revised liberalism of 2010 reminded of the experience of the 1990ies. The parallels appeared to be especially evident in the Russian-American relations. This includes the bilateral Presidential Commission succeeding to the Gor-Chernomyrdin Commission and the unprecedented rapprochement with the USA comparable with the period of 199201998 as well as the trust-based personal relations between the leaders of thetwo powers Medvedev and Barack Obama (their historical analogue is the presidential line of Yeltsin-Clinton), etc. The ideological-political programs of Yeltsin and Medvedev also have much in common. Both of them declared the need for large-scale economic transformations. For Yeltsin this was creation of market economy in Russia and democratization, for Medvedev this is overcoming the raw-material dependence and development of hi-tech industries.

Whereas the priority attention to the West resulted from the individual preferences of Medvedev and his team, the attention to the APR stemmed from the objective processes in the system of international relations. In 2010 it became definitely clear that the center of the global policy and economy was gradually shifting to the region of Asia and the Pacific. This can be illustrated by the fact that this spatial area was simultaneously represented by four world economic leaders: the USA, Japan, the P.R.C. and India. It is noteworthy that since 2009 the USA has been positioning itself as a Pacific power. Worthy of attention is the popularity of the idea of the Big Two among the American elite that implies partnership of Washington and Beijing. The global agenda has become increasingly dependent on the opinion of the ATR subjects, especially during the work of the Group of Twenty. The positions of the PRC, Japan, India, Australia, Indonesia and South Korea are respected and taken into account in the process of coordination of the programs of stabilization of global economy. Moreover, China has started increasingly influencing the state of the world financial system. Its financial-monetary frictions with the USA because of the RMB exchange rate evoked a global response. Kremlin could no longer ignore these processes. It urgently had to boost its activity on the Asian-Pacific track actively using the mechanism of presidential diplomacy.

As distinguished from the USA the RF did not come to the APR as “a local player”. It positioned itself rather as an external subject ready to get widely involved in regional processes. This was demonstrated by Medvedev’s visits to the PRC (September), Vietnam (October) and South Korea (November). Even if the Russian party did reveal its interest in the purely Asian-Pacific problems during the events, it did so exclusively in the context of relations with particular counterparts. For example, Kremlin’s decision to join the East-Pacific Summit (EPS) made during Medvedev’s visit to Vietnam to a large extent became a concession to Hanoi for expansion of the bilateral political-economic relations. “The distance” of the RF in the APR was dictated by the obvious weakness of the infrastructure of the Russian Far East. Moscow just lacks any basis for direct influence in the region.

In the strategic dimension the year of 2010 was characterized by formation of a new doctrine of the RF activities in international policy. It is based on the platform of the so-called modernization diplomacy (or “diplomacy for modernization”). A year after adoption of the National Security Strategy of the RF until 2020 Kremlin started formulating a qualitatively new doctrinal program identifying the priorities of external activity. It implies use of traditional political and diplomatic mechanism to raise the technological potential of Russian economy and to promote interests of the Russian business on the world arena. According to the modernization policy the RF foreign policy machinery is to serve the economy. In the opinion of Medvedev’s administration it will enable Russia to cut the technological lag from western countries within a short time, to increase its foreign-economic potential and to consolidate its applied background as a leading world power.

The decision on elaboration of the modernization strategy was declared by Medvedev in his Address to the Federal Assembly on November 12, 2009. Right after that the MFA and the government office were given the task to prepare a program of the work of the foreign policy mechanism in the foreign economic track and to draw up a list of criteria of foreign policy effectiveness. In February 2010 the Department of Foreign Policy Planning of the MFA prepared two documents: the Criteria of Appraisal of the Results of the Foreign Policy Activities for Solution of Modernization Tasks and the Program of Effective System-Based Use of Foreign Policy Factors with a view to long-term development of the country. Both of them formed the basis of the program of modernization diplomacy. After interdepartmental finalizing the Program of Effective System-Based Use of Foreign Policy Factors was approved by Medvedev on September 30, 2010.

The modernization strategy is aimed at large-scale build-up of the RF weight in the world economy. Under the strategy contacts with all countries of the world are considered from the point of view of national economic interests. In terms of the strategy the foreign policy administration must be concerned about getting the maximum trade-economic dividends from interaction with a certain subject rather than about the political benefit of the relations with it. At the same time the strategy authorizes wider presence of the RF business abroad.  

Despite the healthy pragmatism the new strategy has a number of institutional shortcomings. The main responsibility for its implementation is placed of a pool of departments, with the MFA having the leading position among them. However, it should be taken into account that the department in Smolenskaya Sennaya square is focused on the work in the political-diplomatic sphere. Economic topics have never been its primary ones., even if it concerns the issue of its political “support”. The MFA structure has only one division responsible for foreign economic issues. This was the Department of Economic Cooperation headed by Alexander Gorban. The efforts of this only structure are insufficient to ensure comprehensive political support of the RF expansion in the world economy. 

One must not disregard the competition between this department and the MFA in general and the Ministry of Economic Development that does not strengthen the possibilities of Lavrov’s department, either. The tacit struggle for the foreign-economic palm is currently won by the Ministry of Economic Development with decided superiority. It controls the RF trade representative offices throughout the world and the intergovernmental commissions on trade-economic cooperation. Besides, the Ministry of Economic development has a pool of specialized departments involved in ensuring the foreign-economic interests of the RF. Formally the department of Elvira Nabiullina is not the main supervisor of the modernization strategy.

The implementation of the program put the point of serious optimization of the MFA administration before Kremlin. The existing institutional mismatch can be resolved either by increasing the number of political-economic departments in the MFA (a number of them will inevitably duplicate similar structures in the Ministry of Economic Development) or by creating a special institution specializing in foreign economic topics exclusively. It may be modeled after the Ministry of Foreign Trade of the USSR (the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations of the USSR since 1988). Medvedev’s team stopped short of eliminating the executive shortcomings of the modernization doctrine before the end of 2010. As a result although the practical implementation of the complex of the MFA developments did start, it had a selective character. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs tested the scheme of closer cooperation with business on certain territorial directions in the demo-mode. In most cases, however, it was not economic expansion (urged for by the Program of Effective System-Based Use of Foreign Policy Factors) but rather political support of business. This practice has already been used by the MFA before. There was no question of any tangible results in such a situation. As a result, in 2010 neither the modernization strategy nor the process of its implementation were mentioned either in the Annual Address of the president or in his program statements.

2010 proved notable by the fact that for the first time since the beginning of Medvedev’s legislature the Kremlin refused to promote its own status initiatives on the international arena. There occurred an actual refusal from the offensive line that could be traced in the foreign policy of the RF before. In 2008 and 2009 the Russian administration was actively lobbying the idea of creation of a new security architecture in Europe in its dialogue with Euro-Atlantic countries. This was the main idea of Medvedev’s speeches in Berlin and Evian. The draft agreement on European security saw the light of the day in 2009. This topic almost became “the fixed idea” of the Russian foreign policy strategy on the European track. Nothing like that was recorded in 2010. Although the Kremlin turned back to the question of European security, it did that without the former zeal. It did not offer any alternatives of the declared initiative.

The refusal from the offensive approach in the foreign policy strategy was dictated by a number of circumstances. Firstly, promotion of the idea of creating new European security was not duly understood by the direct addressees: the EU states. They perceived the project as an attempt of the Kremlin to create a mechanism of military-political control over the European situation. That is, nobody appeared to need Moscow’s proposals. And given the fact that Russia failed to support its position with weighty political arguments, it was clear that it could not act as a subject independently forming the agenda within particular regions. Secondly, at the turn of 2009-2010 Moscow changed its vector of interests on the world arena. Instead of military-political it became a political-economic one. In these conditions there was no need to launch big foreign-policy initiatives. Within the framework of implementation of the modernization strategy major attention was paid to promotion of concrete economic projects that did not require wide public support.

Like in the previous years the most convincing segment of the RF foreign-policy activity was tactic. Medvedev’s administration worked out quite a good line of short-term and medium-term conduct in a certain territorial direction. Quite often the preference was given to models of responding “based on the situation” rather than to the previously elaborated models. Moscow watched the situation and tried to adapt to the already outlined trends or to work out an answer to a set challenge. Such a model of the game is a result of the foreign-policy vision of the Russian administration. It felt much more confident in the tactical rather than in the strategic planning register.

A major element of the foreign policy tactic of the Kremlin still was the “corridor” policy. It involved maintaining trust-based contacts with the so-called “corridor” partners. The matter in question is a number of states of the North and South Europe having close ties with the RF, which allowed to involve them for promotion of Russian interests inside the European Union. Such subjects acted in the role of some kind of “corridors” through which Moscow is trying to promote its initiatives within the frames of the united Europe. In 2010 Moscow was doing its best to consolidate their ties with the “corridor” subjects, including the top level. In April Medvedev made an official visit to Slovakia and in July he had his working visit to Finland. Both trips were positioned as the steps promoting better partnership between Moscow and Bratislava and Helsinki.

The “corridor” line of 2010 was characterized by the Kremlin’s attempts to get new states involved in the pool of its confidential counterparts. For example, the status of a “corridor” partner was definitely secured to Slovakia. A package of nine documents was signed based on the results of the Russian-Slovakian summit held in April. It identifies the format of cooperation between the countries in such spheres as power engineering, railway industry and military-technical cooperation. All the arrangements are mutually beneficial. Apart from the Moscow has confirmed to Bratislava its guarantees for export of energy resources. The established system of bilateral relations is supposed to contribute to the game of the Slovak administration on the European grounds according to the Kremlin’s rules.

The next country supposed to join the group of “corridor” partners was Norway. Until 2010 the relations between Moscow and Oslo were not especially trust-based. This was largely due to the unresolved issue of demarcation of the marine space. Both countries laid claims to the Arctic shelf that is potentially rich in energy resources. In 2010 this problem was erased in the bilateral relations. In April Medvedev paid a state visit to the Kingdom. In the process of consultations the parties came to an accommodation on demarcation of marine territories. Moscow agreed to concede Norway some part of the disputed shelf. In September in Murmansk Medvedev and the Norwegian prime-minister Jens Stoltenberg signed the Agreement on demarcation of marine territories in the Barents Sea and in the Arctic Ocean based on the results of the negotiations. It came into force in Russia in April 2011. The Agreement that considered the Oslo’s demands created conditions for Russian-Norwegian relations to become partner relations. Neither country wants to share the Arctic shelf with the USA and Canada. Relying on this “energy­motivated” friendship the Kremlin intends to get Oslo involved às a prominent ally in implementation of its political-economic projects in Europe.

In 2010 Medvedev’s administration continued using the tactical instrument of “confirmation” policy. It involves regular confirmation fo constructive contacts with a group of North European states. This is first of all France, the FRG and Italy. Stable relations with these countries were established in the Soviet period. Such tactic does not require any special diplomatic qualities. Everything that is needed to sue is not to make any serious adjustments in the established format of the interaction. Throughout the year Medvedev’s team pursued the line diligently. There was a serious of “duty” visits (to France in March, to Germany in June, to Italy in July). There were several consultations in the interstate format (with the FRG in July, Italy in December). These events did not result in any breakthroughs. However, they enable the RF to reconfirm stability of the dialogue with its leading counterparts in the united Europe. The format content of the relations with France, the FRG and Italy did not experience any significant changes. These subjects still form the trust-based pool of the RF among the states of the Old Europe.    

In the prominent position in the 2010 realities was also the tactical model known as the policy of “building-in”. having refused from promotion of its own initiatives the Kremlin quite often joined implementation of the proposals made by other subjects. The RF was “building-in” into somebody else’s game, mostly on global problems. In most cases the choice of Moscow in favour of subordinate behavior was motivated: it received either promises or quite concrete concessions for it. For example, in April 2010 Medvedev’s administration joined the USA initiative of strengthening nuclear security. Besides, the Russian party tacitly supported the idea of Barack Obama’s administration of achieving conditions for complete refusal from nuclear weapons. Such a move became part of the Russian-American deal on reduction of strategic offensive weapons (SOW). At the G-20 Summit in Canada in June Medvedev’s team gave its consent to support the French-German scenario of reforming the world financial system. In return Paris and Berlin promised to create conditions for development of applied military-political relations between the EU and the RF. And at the Russia-NATO Summit in November Moscow tried to “get built-in” in the program of creation of the ABM in Europe initiated by the USA. As a compensation for this decision the Russian party considered the possibility of establishing indirect control over the actions of Washington in the field of development of antimissile technologies.

One can trace a certain regularity in the tactical dimension of the foreign policy activities of the RF in 2010: the sufficiently clear fulfillment of certain functional elements did not always have a high efficiency coefficient. The tactic most often had limited efficiency and failed to produce the expected effect.

For example, Moscow was consolidating its “corridor” ties with Finland free of any costs, including by way of unilateral concessions in the field of raw materials supplies. Helsinki receives Russian timber under the financial conditions convenient for Finland. Nevertheless, the Finnish administration was in no hurry to fulfill the “corridor” functions in then EU. Suomi never tried to put the issue of revision of European security on the agenda of the European Union summits. And this is despite the fact Moscow set considerable hope on Finland regarding promotion of its military-political initiative. Formally this situation can be explained by the fact that in 2010 Finland did not chair the EU. De facto nobody prevented Helsinki from launching the discussion on European security at least at the level of heads of European foreign policy departments.      

A similar situation may be traced in case of the FRG. The policy of “confirmation” was implemented on the German track in the most consistent way. There were stable relations with Berlin in the trade-economic and political spheres both on bilateral and multilateral issues. In 2010 Moscow accepted the rules of the game of the French-German duet on global problems. But the return on this line did not quite meet the Kremlin’s interests. At the meeting of Medvedev and FRG Chancellor Angela Merkel in Meseberg on June 5, 2010 the parties adopted the memorandum on possible creation of the Russia-EU Committee on Foreign Policy and Security at the ministerial level. Besides, the German side confirmed its positive attitude to the Russian vision of the system of European security. Nevertheless, before the end of 2010 Berlin never considered it necessary to actualize the project of creation of the Russia-EU Committee on Foreign Policy and Security at the meetings of the EU leaders. Neither was it active in the issue regarding discussion of European security according to the Russian model. And this was despite the fact that Berlin has absolute authority on the EU grounds and the European political project is “synonymous” to the German project.

The limited effectiveness of the foreign policy tactic is related to the insufficient insistence of the Russian administration. Moscow knows how to achieve formal or preliminary agreements on a particular issue. However, it lacks a proper “grip” to launch implementation of such agreements. This is primarily due the mildness of the persons responsible for practical promotion of concrete initiatives. For example, Finland practically fully depends on the RF in timer and gas supplies. However, Medvedev’s administration can neither force it to provide adequate support of Russian proposals on the EU grounds nor get proper political respect from it. For example, the visit of Medvedev to Suomi in June 2010 took place in a situation when Helsinki openly granted political asylum to Chechen militants and made disputable statements about the place and role of contemporary Russia in the international policy. Moscow failed to curb such public attacks.

The situation in the staff policy in 2010 can be characterized as a slack period. There were practically no serious reshuffles in the pool of the departments responsible for the RF activity on the international arena. All the persons supervising formation and practical implementation of foreign policy kept their posts. For example, there were no changes in the international pool in the president’s administration, including deputy Kremlin chief of staff Aleksei Gromov, aide to the president Sergei Prikhodko, head of the foreign policy department Alexander Manzhosin and head of the department of interregional and cultural relations with foreign countries Sergei Vinokurov. Similar statistics was observed in the MFA. Not a single representative of the top echelon of the department on Smolenskaya Sennaya square was replaced.

The lack of notable shifts in the personal register of the foreign-policy administration was dictated by its conformity to the Kremlin’s demands. All major players responsible for the international conduct of the RF accurately fulfilled all the instructions of the top administration of the country. The recommendations provided by them did not contradict the foreign policy vision upheld by the president and his team. Considering the fact that Medvedev’s administration managed to avoid serious failures in foreign policy in 2010, the Kremlin had just no visible reasons for staff reshuffles.

At the same time one cannot speak about complete “staff calm”. There were some point corrections of a personal kind. In most cases they were dictated by situational reasons. The Kremlin had to response to a certain foreign policy problem, with a special administration position created for it. The most convincing illustration of this approach is the staff actions made in the system of the president’s administration. In May 2010 Vladimir Rushailo was appointed special representative of the president for development of relations with Kyrgyzstan. This move was dictated by the forced response of the RF to another political crisis that overtook this republic rather by the striving of the RF to achieve planned stepping up of activity on the Kyrgyz track. Nomination of Rushailo embodied Moscow’a attempt to find new institutional channels to maintain relations with Bishkek in an emergency situation. A similar implication existed in the appointment of Mikhail Zurabov special representative of the president for development of trade-economic relations with Ukraine in January 2010. Moscow froze its top-level political contacts with Kiev in August 2009. At the same time Zurabov was appointed ambassador in Ukraine but he stayed in the RF. He took office only in January 2010 right after the first round of presidential elections that showed that the incumbent president Viktor Yushchenko would not be re-elected for the second term. Prior to his departure to Kiev Zurabov was vested with powers to control all trade-economic contacts with Ukraine. His appointment was a supplement to the already available diplomatic functional rather than an attempt of the Kremlin to build-up economic ties with Kiev. 

The staff reshuffles in the MFA were in line with the general trend of 2010. They were characterized by low dynamics and narrow specialization. Most changes in the top echelon of the major foreign policy department occurred in the Euro-Atlantic area. Three out of four heads of the existing European departments changed during the year. There appeared new supervisors for the North, Central and South-east Europe. Besides, in February the administration of the ministry decided on the person responsible for the USA and Canada. Alexander Darchiev became director of the Department of North America. This position was vacant from October 2009 after the previous head of the department Igor Neverov was appointed ambassador of the RF in Sweden. The consistent change of heads of European departments was related to the desire of the MFA to adapt its work to the focus of Medvedev’s administration on interaction with Euro-Atlantic countries. The new supervisors of European directions will have consider the specificity of the Kremlin “turn” towards the West.

An interesting situation in the staff policy formed in 2010 on the German track. Moscow tried to apply the principles of the modernization policy at the personal level of work of the political-diplomatic mechanism. Moreover, it was done in the most applied context: in the form of integration of the potential of the diplomatic corps and the business community. In June the RF ambassador in the FRG Vladimir Kotenev was displaced from his office and became the chief managing director of Gazprom Germania GmbH (a one-hundred percent subsidiary of the Russian Gazprom). His place was taken by Vladimir Grinin that had formerly been the RF ambassador in Poland. The choice in favour of Grinin was dictated by the fact that it was he who provided normalization of the Russian-Polish relations. Somewhat earlier, in March 2010, Dmitri Lyubonsky, one of the most promising specialists in Germany in the MFA system, became the director of the Third European Department (responsible for the FRG and other states of Central Europe). As a result the Kremlin got a reputable pool of subjects capable of promoting both political and economic interests in the relations with the FRG and available both at the level of the system of state administration and business.

The priority of the territorial foreign policy directions was determined by te Kremlin’s choice. Due to the focus of Medvedev’s team on the West and the simultaneously increased interest in the APR countries these regions were in the focus of the RF foreign policy in 2010. These were the regions of the most high-status visits of the RF leaders accompanied by high-profile decisions in the trade-economic and military-political spheres. Russian mass media made high attention to the relations with the West (mostly associated with the Euro-Atlantic countries) and the Asian-Pacific region.  

In territorial projection the dialogue with the West throughout 2010 was divided into three independent political-spatial segments. The first segment included the countries of the so-called “benevolent West”. These were the traditional partners of the USSR/RF from West Europe (such as France and Germany) and the USA that joined them in the conditions of the “reloading”. The Kremlin perceived these states as the main embodiment of the western world and as partners capable of ensuring higher level of technological development of Russian economy due to their economic possibilities. Next came the pool of the subjects that could be characterized as “problem West”. It included the states having problem or even complicated relations of various degrees of gravity with the RF (Poland, Great Britain, etc.). This format of contacts could be both the legacy of the Soviet epoch and a quality acquired in the “Russian” political-historical period. Finally, the third group was the so-called “other West”. These are the countries that were quite of limited interest for the RF that often boiled down to public rhetoric without any proper practical backing. Most subjects of this group are developed APR countries (in particular, South Korea and Singapore).

Although the countries of “the benevolent West” have obvious preferences compared to other members of this political-economic entity, the interaction with them in 2010 developed in rather a non-uniform way. Formally the RF preserved its line towards mutual rapprochement based on the policy of “confirmation” and the policy of “building­in”, especially in the economic plane (the latter being dominated by power engineering). However, the price of this partnership grew noticeably over the year. The Euro-Atlantic players were willing to make advances to Russia only when it did not contradict their own national interests. Besides, all their goodwill gestures were clearly tied-in with Moscow’s concessions. The countries of “the benevolent West” did not show any special zeal for building strategic contacts with the RF without counter-moves of the Russian administration.

An illustrative example of this approach was the Russian initiative on development of partnership with the European Union in the field of modernization. It was practically outlined at the RF-EU summit in Rostov-on-Don on June 1, 2010. At the summit the parties approved the ambitious program of “Partnership for Modernization”. It became one of the first practical components of the RF modernization strategy on the European track. Making this move Medvedev’s team expected the West in the person of the European Union a priori to play according to Russia’s rules due to the economic benefit of the proposed decisions. However, the EU administration refused to make any applied actions within the frames of the designated project as the RF did not tie it in with clear concessions on its part confining itself to rhetoric.

The key counterpart among the subjects of “the benevolent West” for Russia in 2010 was still Germany. The contacts with it were characterized by dynamics and noticeable diversification. They were practically equally maintained both by the president and the head of the government. The priority of relations with the FRG was dictated by the professional specialization of the representatives of the top Russian administration. The incumbent chairman of the RF government Vladimir Putin specialized in German topics while working at the SSC. After his accession to power this fact enabled him to establish constructive contacts with the greater part of the German political establishment rather quickly. Hence, the RF practically stopped having serious problems in the dialogue with the FRG both at the interstate level and along the line of the business community. The personified links with Berlin along the premier’s line are still relevant.  

The Russian-German relations of 2010 were dominated by economy. The RF was the main supplier of oil and gas for German industries. In its turn, the FRG was among the leading exporters of industrial products and investments to the Russian market. The priority of the trade-economic register of relations was vividly demonstrated by Putin’s visit to Germany on November 25-26, 2010. Apart from negotiations with the leaders of the Federal Republic, including Chancellor Merkel, the head of the Russian government paid special attention to the German business community. In particular, he spoke at the annual economic forum of executives and top-managers of companies organized by the influential edition Süddeutsche Zeitung and met representatives of business circles of Germany.

An important place among the countries of “the benevolent West” in 2010 as taken by the USA. The dynamics of Russian-American contacts throughout the period under consideration developed under the impact of the impulses set during the “reloading-2009” period. The interstate interaction did not have any qualitatively new content. However, the agenda formed a year before was sufficient for Russian relations with America to keep having a prominent position in the system of the Russian political-diplomatic priorities. For Medvedev’s administration the stable dialogue with the USA was a way to confirm its influence on the world arena. In other words, for the RF the interaction with the United States substantiates its claims to the status of a leading world power with global aspirations.

In the applied register the bilateral relations developed lacking any really big topics. From April 2009 till April 2010 the main issue on interstate partnership determining their agenda was reduction of strategic offensive weapons (SOW). But after the new Agreement on the SOW was signed in April 2010, the Russian-American dialogue lost its axial problem line that would set their direction. Formally this status was claimed for by economy throughout the year. However, it was Russia only that was interested in stepping up relations in this sphere. The idea of close economic partnership with the RF did not much enthuse the USA. Washington just did not see any subject economic liquidity of Moscow beyond power engineering. But in the power engineering sphere Russia was rather an opponent for it than a partner as both powers claimed to the influence in the same regions rich in energy resources (the Caspian Sea, in particular). 

Therefore, the sides had to play tactical games when major attention was paid to clearly localized issues of bilateral relations in the world agenda. Their grater part was of no principal significance for purely Russian-American contacts. For example, the scheme of Russia’s accession to the WTO actualized in the bilateral dialogue in June 2010 was unable to revitalize Russian-American economic relations with the exception of repealing the Jackson-Vanik amendment. Joining the free market does not imply that its most high-profile members must automatically step up communications with the newly joined subject. Everything will depend on the sentiments of the business community. So far the American business elites do not strive for large-scale expansion on the Russian market. Another topic in the focus of attention of the RF and the USA was the issue of relations between Moscow and NATO. It was significant only for the European ambitions of the Kremlin. Since 2003 the North Atlantic Alliance has stopped playing the part of the key partner for the White House in implementation of force initiatives in the external environment. The USA currently considers the bloc as a political organization supporting American influence in Europe but at the same time unable to ensure its own collective interests without the help of the USA AF. 

The dialogue with the countries of “the problem West” in 2010 is best remembered for some improvement of the general political-economic situation. There were no really significant breakthroughs there; however, there outlined obvious trends of mutual solution of problem issues. In some case the “détente” was initiated by Russia. Its administration demonstrated the necessary understanding of the difficulty of the situation and was able to make a number of symbolic steps in favour of the “problem” counterparts. In other episodes the change of the tone of the interaction was dictated by the change of the political conjuncture in “difficult” countries. As a result of the Kremlin’s task-oriented efforts and the fluctuations of the environment “the problem West” was no longer perceived by the RF as an obvious opponent.

The biggest success in relations with difficult Euro-Atlantic subjects was achieved by Russia on the British track. The major part of the work was done by the new government of the Kingdom headed by the conservatives and liberal democrats. The Kremlin had already stated its position before and was waiting for reply signals from the counterpart. Before coming to power yet the Tory had declared the need for cardinal reevaluation of relations with the RF. They continued their line in the government status. The conservative consider Russian-British relations to be a condition for consolidating their influence on the world arena. The RF is a permanent member of the UN Security Council and the G-20. Stable relations with it ensure that the British voice will be heard at the global level.

There did not occur any fast rapprochement between the powers. The conservative and liberal democrats came to power in May 2010. However, practical normalization of the contacts happened only in November at the G-20 summit in Seoul. The pause made by the conservatives was caused by the absorption of the cabinet with solution of internal economic problems. Besides, the British government had to pay priority attention to their traditional allies: the USA, France and the FRG. After that only London paid attention to Moscow.

During the November meeting between Medvedev and the prime-minister of the Kingdom David Cameron the British showed their interest in stepping up relations with Moscow in the field of hi-tech and investments. In the process of the negotiations the British team offered Medvedev and his “close circle” to create a separate Russian-British program of cooperation in the designated spheres. The project of Cameron government was named “Partnership in the name of knowledge”. It includes five tracks: economy and modernization, innovation, high technologies, investments and education. It is supposed that the project may be implemented with participation of the relevant ministries of the liberal-conservative cabinet and British business structures. This concerns not only the project of the innovation town Skolkovo announced by the Kremlin but also subject-related interaction in the business community.

A constructive tone of development in 2010 was also characteristic of the contacts with Poland, another traditional representative of “the problem West”. After the chairman of the Russian government Putin took part in the action of symbolic reconciliation with his Polish colleague Donald Tusc in Katyn under the pressure of the business community, a certain positive shift was noted in the bilateral relations. The trend was not seriously affected by the tragic change of the Polish president the new head of the Polish state Bronislav Komorovsky continued the “détente” line even to a greater extent than his predecessor Leh kachinsky who tragically died in the air crash. The peak of the process was the visit of Medvedev to Poland on December 6-7, 2010. This trip showed that the complicated stage in the bilateral interaction had come to an end. The sides have embarked the way of relatively constructive cooperation without cultivating the hidden resentment and historical-political grudges.

At the same time the Russian-Polish relations in the applied dimension developed in the mode of unprecedented normalization. Throughout the greater part of the year the sides regularly confirmed establishment of the trust-based climate in their relations and the preparedness for intensive cooperation. However, such rhetoric was practically not consolidated at the level of real actions. Suffice it to say that most documents signed on the basis of the results of Medvedev’s visit to Warsaw are framework or declarative. In this respect the most demonstrative example was the Declaration on cooperation with a view to modernization of economy endorsed by the Ministry of economic development of the RF and the Polish minister of economy. The countries have no real program of s dialogue on the issue of high technologies. 

The sides lack mutual understanding on subject-related development of contacts in the business sphere. The Kremlin counts on power engineering while Poland, although standing up for the idea of a more diversified approach, considers the idea from the position of its purely subjective interests (primarily regarding attraction of Russian investments to the Polish market). At the same time Poland is extremely skeptical about the idea of building close cooperation in power engineering with Moscow. The reason is the unwillingness to lose its economic sovereignty. The Poles are sincerely afraid that in case of mass coming of Russian companies to its power engineering market they won’t be able to control either the volumes of oil and gas supplies coming from the RF or their own assets in this sphere. This scenario is fraught with serious costs for a country seriously dependent on imported energy materials. Getting control over Polish companies the Kremlin will be able to press upon Warsaw in certain issues of its external and defense policy. Polish politicians know how this is done from the example of Belorussia and Ukraine that have bound themselves with too tight energy ties with Moscow. Warsaw is absolutely unwilling to get into an analogous status.

Russia’s presence in “other West” in 2010 was absolutely limited in terms of its content and sporadic in terms of its appearance. Moscow looked at the region mostly with a view to pursuance of its energy policy and only when there were some high-profile summits of multilateral; organizations (G20, for instance). The subjects of this political-spatial pool did not receive any concentrated bilateral attention. Thus, the RF confirmed the absolutely conservative notion of “West” that stays within the interpretation of the 1970ies and the inability to perceive the trends of global political-economic development adequately. In the conditions of a comprehensive shift of the center of world policy and economy to the Asian-Pacific region (where a considerable number of West-oriented players are concentrated) the Kremlin persistently keeps its loyalty to the more peripheral Europe.

The raw material component prevailed in the RF policy in the Asian-acific direction. The Kremlin’s intention to expand its presence in the region relied on the real possibilities of the Russian economy. In the APR the Kremlin tried to abandon the old Soviet practice and to develop the most trust-based relations with a limited group of subjects. One should primarily note China and Vietnam among them. Such an approach laid open both the obvious inability of Russian diplomacy to achieve real diversification of contacts with subjects of the most influential and dynamically developing region in the world and the forthright “Soviet character” of the foreign policy line of Medvedev’s administration with regard to its practical elements. The vision of the West in the style of the USSR of the 1970ies of the present Russian administration correlates with a no less Soviet approach in building communications in the Asian-Pacific region. The main stake is placed exclusively on the former Soviet allies while other and no less high-profile subjects (such as South Korea, Indonesia or Malaysia) are left aside.

The applied purpose of Russia’s policy in the Asian-Pacific region was reduced to preservation and expansion, given favourable possibilities, of the sales market of two types of products: raw materials and armament systems. In the former case this is not gas and oil only but timber, metal and grain. Besides, as the year of 2010 showed, Asian players are ready to invest in development of the Russian industrial infrastructure to increase supplies of raw material resources. The growing deliveries from the RF tell favourably on their production potential.

The role of a raw materials supplier in the Asian direction was the primary one for Russia. It is in the raw materials segment that the Kremlin turned to the APR. the raw materials factor was supplemented by the military-technical line. Some of the leading consumers of the products of the domestic defense industry are also in the APR. these are such countries as India, Vietnam, the PRC and Indonesia. Relying on deliveries of raw materials and armament Moscow tried to ensure strengthening of political relations with the major subjects of the region. The dialogue was built on pragmatic grounds exclusively. The RF guaranteed its commitments for deliveries of certain kinds of products getting in return actions strengthening stability of political cooperation. 

The stake on rather narrow two-level export is dictated by the fact that the RF has very limited attractiveness for Asian counterparts. Russian industry, with the exception of certain segments of the MIC, practically does not manufacture any products that could prove competitive on the APR markets. This is not power plant engineering, construction mechanical engineering and aircraft engineering, that is the industries where the USSR and then Russia have been always considered to be among the leading producers of the world level. The “Asian tigers” that are included into the “West” have already developed these production segments. In the sphere of instrument making and high technologies the RF has fallen so far behind the states of Asia and the Pacific that it has to be an importer of their products.

The year of 2010 was marked by a considerable reduction of Russia’s attention to Latin America. Compared to 2008-2009, the number of direct political-diplomatic contacts with the countries of the region dropped sharply. There were no visitations of the leaders of the country to the countries of the western hemisphere. The greater part of responsibility for maintaining operative contacts shifted to the dedicated intergovernmental groups and the MFA. In particular, the region was visited on working trips only by the Minister of foreign affairs Sergei Lavrov and the deputy chairman of the government Igor Sechin. Such a level of attention of the administration evidenced that the Kremlin no longer considers latin America to be a priority region for its foreign policy activities.

Throughout the year the policy of Russia on the post-Soviet space balanced on a verge between limited success and chronic pointlessness. The first trend involves more active relations with Ukraine. After accession of Viktor Yanukovich tom power in Kiev the Kremlin succeeded within quite a short time in normalizing the bilateral relations and then achieving their partial practical filling. Russian elites started talking about the beginning of building “special” relations with Ukraine after the example of the system of interaction that has existed since the 1940ies between the USA and Great Britain. Nevertheless, there still limited success on the Ukrainian track. Yanukovich’s cabinet is willing to intensify relations only in the industries the potential of which cannot be recovered but efforts of the Ukrainian business alone. The RF is granted the right of a certain donor of local economy. At the same time there was no special rapprochement at the political and military level along the line of Moscow-Kiev. Ukrainian elites are still West-oriented.  

The actions of the RF in international institutions in 2010 were not distinguished by any special grandiosity. The Kremlin actually refused from independent participation in the process of formation of the global agenda at the supranational level. In the influential structures, such as the UN< the G8 and G20 Moscow supported the position of West-European players and voluntarily took the part of their “junior” partner. Such an understatement of its subjective status was related both to the excessively liberal orientation of Medvedev’s administration and hopes for obtaining technologies and investments for being loyal. The liberal line was also reflected in the dialogue with the EU and the NATO. In its relations with these institutions Moscow tried to act as a constructive partner taking regard for the interests of its collective counterparts. The only structure where the RF tried to be independent was the OSCE. Despite the obvious pointlessness of this association the RF tried to push the idea of creation of a new security architecture in Europe through it.