Russia-Belarus gas conflict

Tensions are growing at the "Belarusian front" of Russia's energy policies as the sides are raising stakes trying to win the war of nerves. The Russian side first reduced gas supplies to the republic by 15%, then by 30% and now Gazprom is to cut natural gas deliveries to Belarus by up to 85%, which in fact means almost complete suspension of the gas transit. Moreover, Belarusian president Alexander Lukashenko is personally pushing the Russian gas monopolist to such steps having ordered the transit cutoff. Minsk has already informed Moscow of siphoning off transit gas.

The Belarusian side is not concerned by the fact that the Yamal-Europe transit gas pipeline actually belongs to Gazprom that has every right to manage this pipeline. Minsk does not pay attention to the fact that information about Gazprom's debt for Russian gas transit (as Minsk claims) via Belarus should have been posted much earlier and publicly. Now there is an impression that Gazprom's debt, or its amount of $260m to be precise, was simply "devised" by Minsk in a couple of days to provide some financial counter claims to Russia.

However, even without them the positions of Belarus in the war of nerves are quite strong in reality. For instance, Lukashenko at any moment may resort to his favorite weapon - blackmailing Moscow with the possibility to mobilize the Belarusian public opinion on anti-Russian (anti-Moscow) sentiments. As practice shows, all post-Soviet leaders of Russia have been sensitive to such instruments. Another efficient lever is Minsk's threats to freeze military cooperation with Moscow - this thesis ideally fits anti-western sentiments prevailing in the Russian public and supported by substantial part of the mass media. In such conditions it will be very difficult for representatives of the Russian ruling tandem to make public statements about the lack of a vital necessity in close military cooperation with Belarus. Thus, Minsk's emotional arguments about "risks for Russia to lose a key and extremely necessary military ally" will ensure a required effect leading to concessions in spheres beyond military and technical cooperation, e.g. in the gas sphere.

By Stanislav Mitrakhovich, NESF leading expert