Tension rising between Moscow and Minsk

Belarusian president Alexander Lukashenko keeps demonstrating attempts to raise stakes in his game with Russia showing that he has new energy and political friends capable of decreasing Belarus' dependence on Moscow. Following his recent interview with Russian journalists, in which the Belarusian leader in particular declared about readiness "to bring oil by rail but not to fall on his knees", Lukashenko visited Turkey. According to information posted in the mass media, the sides negotiated a possibility of organizing Iranian oil supplies to Belarus through Turkey's seaport of Ceyhan.

The Belarusian leader is planning to visit Iran in the near future. Objectively speaking all attempts of Minsk to diversify imports of hydrocarbons have few prospects to be implemented due to geographical and technological reasons as well as to the republic's de facto weak economy. Any tanker-and-railroad oil deliveries are inferior to Russian supplies through pipelines from the logistical point of view. Besides, Belarus cannot afford overpaying for the commodity for a long time. Even if it manages to continue such supplies until the upcoming presidential elections scheduled for this December it is anyway unclear how the republic is going to cope with substantial cuts in Russian oil and gas subsidies. One of the ways is a well-known appeal to political importance of ties between Minsk and Moscow, which Belarusian authorities eagerly employ. In other words, threatening to find other friends not only on energy issues but also to make some strategic choice not towards Russia.

However, this is also not simple, since Lukashenko's reputation is well-known and quite definite in the West. The Europeans are not ready to accept him as their full-fledged partner even if Minsk demonstratively pursues a pro-Western course (by the way, Belarusian political and economic realities do not match very well the latter). All these reasons do not mean that in the current conflict with Minsk Russian authorities have an absolute advantage. On the contrary, possibilities to criticize Lukashenko are seriously limited. It is not easy to implement current attacks on him. Another case is the mass consciousness of Russian people who were for a long time convinced of Lukashenko's extreme importance for Russia as a military and political ally facing NATO and pro-Western forces. This point of view still exists in a great number of comments by different experts and journalists who consider themselves part of the patriotic discourse in the Russian mass media, even despite a clearly voiced position of president Dmitry Medvedev on this problem. It will be even more difficult to opt for tough criticism of
Lukashenko on TV during the elections when the Russian state mass media will have to define their attitude towards the pro-European liberal opposition that is surely to rally against Lukashenko. Support to these politicians (traditionally accused by Russia of their pro-Western stance) is not a guaranteed scenario. The Belarusian president understands very well that the Russian leadership will have to find the way out of this collision. This gives Lukashenko chances to succeed and it broadens his space for political bargaining with Moscow.

By Stanislav Mitrakhovich, NESF leading expert