Main page > Products > The fuel and energy complex of Russia - Series of analytical reports > Nationalisation and Privatisation: Two Industry Development Tendencies

Nationalisation and Privatisation: Two Industry Development Tendencies

Nationalisation and Privatisation: Two Industry Development Tendencies

Experts have been saying in the last few years that state capitalism is being developed in Russia which allegedly began with the oil and gas industry. An opinion can often be encountered that Putin’s reign has become an era of nationalisation. Meanwhile, it is hardly worthwhile evaluating the situation with property in the oil and gas sector with so little space for ambiguity. One has indeed seen the nationalisation of Yukos assets, but one has also seen an IPO of Rosneft, growth in foreign owners’ share of Gazprom, and the privatisation of SIBUR which is currently in full swing. Remember also that Putin’s presidency began with privatisation deals, for example the sale of Slavneft.

Most probably, the problem is subtler. It is not ruled out that the nationalisation stage has been but a part of a larger-scale process wherein the Putin elites are gaining control of property in the oil and gas sector. This in turn cannot be achieved without the final privatisation of the most important assets. For this is the only way to insure the property against political risks.

Private property and political stability are the two elements of the long-term project for change of the sector owners. Curiously enough, the two stages of the Putin plan have overlapped: nationalisation is still in progress, but privatisation is also in full swing.

All these issues will be dealt with in the new Report. It will cover in details the following topics:

  • «Oil and gas magnets»

    • Whom assets are registered to and what companies are the winners in the Putin-sponsored nationalisation of the industry
    • Slices of the oil and gas pie gained by Rosneft, Gazprom, and Gazprom Neft
    • Surgutneftegas as the first private company of the new political model
  • Potential victims

    • Which companies risk changing hands to the benefit of the Putin-supervised clans of bureaucrats and politicians
    • Survival strategies for TNK-BP, Lukoil, RussNeft, Bashneft, and Tatneft
  • Wars for assets

    • Showdowns between the Putin-controlled clans over the property they gain
    • Conflict over SIBUR and Gazprom’s oilfield licences and showdowns over offshore licences
  • Extraction privatisation

    • Beginning of the privatisation of state-owned assets
    • Privatisation of Gazprombank and a number of other Gazprom units
    • Transfer of state-owned fields to Gazprom and Rosneft as a latent form of privatisation
    • Future of Rosneftegaz
  • Medium-term forecast of developments

The contents of the report:

Introduction. Main Stages of Putin’s Policy on Oil and Gas Sector Property 2
Chapter 1. «Oil and Gas Magnets» 5
Gazprom: Still the Favourite 5
First Front: Undistributed Stock. Expansion to the East 7
Rosneft: in Pursuit of the Leader 16
Gazprom Neft: Getting Ready for an Independent Voyage 20
Chapter 2. Completion of the Nationalisation Stage 24
TNK-BP 24
LUKOIL 28
RussNeft 31
Tatneft and Bashneft 34
Chapter 3. War for Production 38
Chapter 4. Privatisation of What Has Been Nationalised 47
Privatisation of Rosneft 51
Chapter 5. Future of the Oil and Gas Aristocracy 54

Date of issue September 15, 2008

 


If you are interested to obtain please contact » Elena Kim

Other issues:
Bookmark and Share

Analytical series “The Fuel and Energy Complex of Russia”:

Outlook for Russian LNG Industry
Russian Energy and West One Year after Ukraine Conflict Began: Are There Connections Still?
Green Agenda in Russia during Bitter Conflict with West
After February 2022 the agenda was radically rewritten. Western companies began leaving Russia en masse, economic relations with the West were drastically reduced, and the Russian economy began to be pushed violently from the global economic space, hemmed in by sweeping sanctions. All that was, to put it mildly, not the best background for talking about ESG. Especially because tasks of survival and stability under unprecedented pressure became the priority in the economy. In late 2022, however, attempts to reanimate the ESG agenda already became obvious. The message is put across insistently that it is important to Russia regardless of the foreign policy situation. While earlier the “green pivot” was seen as an opportunity to attract Western investors and their technological solutions to Russia, now Keynesian reliance on domestic manufacture is discussed.
Oil and Gas Sector Regulation in 2022 and Prospects for 2023
Gazprom at the Forefront of Economic and Political Battles with Europe
Gazprom is being actively thrown out of the market. Its annual supplies to Europe have shrunk from the previous 150 billion to 65 billion cubic metres of gas. European officials assure that they have already learnt how to live without Russian gas, so they will bring its purchases down to but nominal values in 2023. Their main hope is liquefied natural gas. Today the EU must make a crucial decision: whether it has passed the point of no return in gas business with Russia and whether it is certain that its economy will endure without supplies of Russian pipeline gas. Or, on the contrary, Europe will realise after all that the gas balance will not be achieved and the payment for so headlong a rush for LNG will be disproportionate. Assessment of the potential volume of LNG that will appear on the market before the end of the current decade will be the most important factor for making the decision.

All reports for: 2015 , 14 , 13 , 12 , 11 , 10 , 09 , 08 , 07

Rambler's Top100
About us | Products | Comments | Services | Books | Conferences | Our clients | Price list | Site map | Contacts
Consulting services, political risks assessment on the Fuel & Energy Industry, concern of pilitical and economic Elite within the Oil-and-Gas sector.
National Energy Security Fund © 2007

LiveInternet