The dénouement of the gas transit play on the post-Soviet area in nearing.
Gazprom’s policy on bringing gas prices for former Soviet republics to the European level and implementation of projects on bypassing traditional transit states for Russian natural gas made Belarus agree to give away its pipeline system to Gazprom. Ukraine is about to make the same decision.
However, political cycles in Russia and Ukraine currently impose certain restrictions on the sides.
This is especially noticeable in the behavior of Ukrainian ruling elites that vitally need a confident win at the parliamentary elections after Yulia Timoshenko’s imprisonment. The Party of Regions will be trying to ensure it at any cost. Meanwhile, the topic of the gas transportation system is still overly politicized in Ukraine.
A new report elaborates on the following issues:
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Current condition of exports and transit of Russian natural gas to Europe
- The current and future amount of transit
- Existing contracts and variants of their prolongation
- The future level of demand for Russian gas in Europe
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Gazprom seizes the “Belarusian fortress”
- Analyzing the technology of success: how Gazprom was pursuing its objective
- Analysis of new contracts with Belarus and Russian gas prospects on the Belarusian market
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Ukrainian transit and Ukrainian gas market
- Importance of the Ukrainian route of supplies and the standing of the Ukrainian domestic gas market
- Contract system and Kharkov agreements
- The current condition of the Ukrainian GTS
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Ukrainian GTS is in the grip
- Arguments of Russia and counterarguments of Ukraine
- Kiev’s attempts to attract Brussels to the dialogue
- Dilemma: joint venture or gas transportation consortium
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Risks and possibilities of Russian policies on organizing gas transit
- Is the Belarusian gas scenario feasible for Ukraine?
The contents of the report:
Introduction | 3 |
Chapter 1. Exports and transit of natural gas from Russia to Europe | 4 |
1.1. Volume of gas exports | 4 |
1.2. Outside Former Soviet States: Between Prices Linked To Oil And Take-Or-Pay Principle | 5 |
1.3 Supplies to CIS and Baltic states | 8 |
1.4. Existing routes of gas deliveries from Russia to Europe | 10 |
Chapter 2. Settling Belarusian case | 13 |
2.1. Beltransgaz and construction of Yamal-Europe gas pipeline | 13 |
2.2. Contract for 2007 to 2011 | 17 |
2.3. Transit conflict in 2010 | 19 |
2.4. Seizure of Beltransgaz, New System of Relations | 20 |
2.5. Gas supplies and transit through Belarus in 2012 to 2014 | 21 |
Chapter 3. Ukrainian transit and gas market | 23 |
3.1. Major market | 23 |
3.2. Transit monopoly | 27 |
3.3. Contract system and its consequences | 32 |
Chapter 4. Gas grips for Yanukovich | 35 |
4.1. North European gas pipeline | 35 |
4.2. South Stream | 39 |
4.3. Single Economic Space and joint enterprises | 41 |
4.4 Behavior of Ukrainian authorities | 44 |
Chapter 5. Forecast. Is Belarusian gas scenario possible for Ukraine | 49 |
5.1. Contradictions Inside Ukrainian Authorities, Political Struggle | 49 |
5.2. Russia Increases Pressure: Reasons And Consequences | 50 |
5.3. Value of Ukraine’s GTS | 52 |
Date of issue: | March 13, 2012 |